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Minimum Age Requirement for Candidates for Detroit 
Common Council Violates Equal Protection Clause 
of Fourteenth Amendment-Manson v. Edwards* 
Marc Manson desired to be a candidate for a seat on the Detroit 
Common Council, the City's legislative body. He was a citizen of the 
United States, a resident of Detroit, and a registered voter. However, 
he was just twenty-one years old, and, in accordance with the Detroit 
City Charter provision requiring that candidates for Common Coun-
cil be twenty-five years of age,1 the City Clerk refused to accept Man-
son's nominating petition and declined to place his name on the 
primary ballot.2 
Manson brought an action in federal district court to declare un-
constitutional the City Charter's age restriction on candidacy. He was 
joined in his complaint by three Detroit residents who were eighteen, 
twenty-four, and thirty-five years of age, who were registered voters, 
and who alleged that they desired to vote for Manson in the Com-
mon Council election.8 Manson and his coplaintiffs contended that 
the charter provision violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment because it "den[ied] a citizen who is over 18 years 
of age elective office simply because he has not reached the age of 25 
years."4 The equal protection challenge was sustained after a signifi-
cant threshold decision that the law had to be "closely scrutinized for 
a compelling governmental interest."5 This initial decision was vir-
tually dispositive of the case since the defendants had conceded their 
inability to justify the provision's age classification scheme under the 
"compelling governmental interest" test.6 
This Recent Development will discuss the validity and potential 
impact of the court's selection of the compelling interest test to mea-
sure the compliance of Detroit's age restriction on candidacy with the 
fourteenth amendment. It will also explore the possible state goals 
sought to be achieved by requiring a minimum age for candidates 
and examine whether these goals can be viewed as "compelling 
governmental interests." 
" 345 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
I. DETROIT, MICH., CHARTER tit. III, ch. I, § 4 (1963) provides in part: "Any person 
elected to the office of councilman shall be a citizen of the United States, at least 
twenty-five years of age and a resident of the city for at least three years." 
2. 345 F. Supp. at 720-21. 
3. 345 F. Supp. at 720. 
4. 345 F. Supp. at 721. 
5. 345 F. Supp. at 723. 
6. 345 F. Supp. at 721. 
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Judicial analysis of equal protection questions has evolved two 
distinct standards for review of governmental classifications. The 
"rational basis" test7 requires that a statutory classification bear 
"some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."8 Stated 
differently, classifications generally do not constitute constitutional 
violations unless they rest on "grounds wholly irrelevant to the 
achievement of the state's objectives."9 The other standard, the 
"compelling interest" test,10 demands a demonstration that the state's 
restriction is necessary to promote a "compelling state interest."11 
This stricter standard eliminates the presumption of constitutionality 
generally afforded statutory classifications and, in effect, shifts the 
burden of proof from the plaintiff to the state.12 
The compelling interest test is applied in cases where the govern-
mental classification is inherently suspect or where it infringes on a 
fundamental right. Classifications that are clearly ''suspect" include 
those based on race,13 alienage,14 or nationality.15 The classification 
in Manson was predicated on age, which, as the court noted, has not 
yet been categorized as an inherently suspect criterion for classifica-
tion.16 However, while the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' 
7. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 
532 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969). Cf. Richard-
son v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). 
8, Weber v. Aetna Cas. 8c Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972). 
9. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471 (1970), illustrates the use of this standard. A Maryland regulation placed a 250-
dollar-per-month limit on grants for aid for dependent children regardless of the size 
of the family or its actual need. The Supreme Court upheld the regulation because 
the State had a "legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in avoiding dis-
crimination between welfare families and the families of the working poor." 397 U.S. 
at 486. 
IO. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966). 
11. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 {1969) (emphasis original). 
12. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972). 
This discussion of the two-tiered equal protection review may be overly rigid. 
Professor Gerald Gunther has argued in a recent article that the Court last term was 
breaking away from the two-tiered model to demand in certain cases more than a 
rational basis. His proposal is that the Court should retain strict scrutiny of classifi-
cations involving fundamental interests or suspect classifications. In other areas, he 
would have the Court examine whether the means further the legislative ends. This 
test would be relatively narrow since it would only demand that the means sub-
stantially further the ends, not that the means be the least restrictive possible. Gunther, 
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. I (1972). 
13. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967). 
14. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
15. E.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
16. 345 F. Supp. at 722 n.l. The court added that it would be unwise to conclude 
that age may never be considered a suspect classification. Nevertheless, the possibility 
that age will be declared suspect seems remote. The current Court is not inclined to 
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fundamental allegation was a denial of candidacy,17 it emphasized 
that the age classification scheme interfered with the plaintiffs' 
fundamental right to vote for the candidate of their choice.18 As the 
Supreme Court had previously stated, "[T]he right of voters and the 
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation .... "10 
This blending of the rights of voters and candidates is common 
in cases in which qualification requirements for candidacy are chal-
lenged. Typically, the prospective candidate asserts his right to ap-
pear on the ballot, and he and his supporters (if they are coplaintiffs) 
maintain that the barriers to his candidacy deny his supporters the 
right to vote for the candidate of their choice.20 When faced with 
such challenges, courts focus their attention on the voters' rights,21 as 
did the court in Manson. The Supreme Court has not recognized a 
naked fundamental right to run for office,22 but has firmly established 
that the right to vote is fundamental and cannot be infringed by a 
classification that does not meet the compelling state interest test.28 
extend the ambit of the compelling interest test. See Gunther, supra note 12, at 
12-15, 24. Also, an implicit holding that age is not a suspect criterion may have been 
contained in the Court's invalidation of a congressional statute lowering the voting 
age to 18 in state elections. Oregon v. Mitchell,_ 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
17. 345 F. Supp. at 722. 
18. 345 F. Supp. at 722-23. 
19. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). 
20. E.g., Green v. McKeon, 335 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Mogk v. City of 
Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Bolanoski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. 
Mich. 1971); Gonzales v. City of Sinton, 319 F. Supp. 189 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See also 
Stapleton v. Clerk for City of Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Mich. 1970). 
21. See cases cited in note 20 supra. But see McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F. Supp. 
289 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Hayes v. Gill, 52 Hawaii 251, 473 P .2d 872 (1970); Schweitzer v. 
Clerk for City of Plymouth, 381 Mich. 485, 164 N.W .2d 35 (1969). 
22. One of the first cases decided by the Supreme Court involving candidate rights 
was Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944). The complainant claimed a violation of 
his fourteenth amendment rights when members of a state board refused to certify 
correctly the results of a primary, thus depriving him of the nomination and election 
as a representative in the state assembly. The Court in holding no cause of action 
under the fourteenth amendment stated: "The right to become a candidate for state 
office ••. is a right or privilege of state citizenship, not of national citizenship which 
alone is protected by the privileges and immunities clause." 321 U.S. at 7. 
Later, in Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970), the Court stated that a person 
has "a federal constitutional right to be considered for public service without the 
burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications." However, the Court declined to 
consider respondents' argument that the compelling interest test need not be applied 
to situations that involve exclusions from office rather than from voting, since the 
freeholder requirement there challenged did not meet even the "rational basis" test. 
396 U.S. at 362. 
Most recently the Court avoided the question in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 
142-43 (1972), where it said: 
The initial and direct impact of filing fees is felt by aspirants for office, rather 
than voters, and the Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental status 
to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review. However, the rights of 
voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation •••• 
23. E.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 
701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
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Consequently, it is not surprising that the lower courts base their 
decisions upon the established rights of voters rather than resolve the 
difficult question of the constitutional status of candidate rights.24 
For the proposition that classifications with respect to candidacy 
infringe the fundamental right to vote, the court in Manson relied 
upon Bullock v. Carter25 and Williams v. Rhodes.26 Bullock ques-
tioned the constitutionality of the filing fees required of prospective 
candidates in Texas. Under the Texas Election Code, the payment of 
a filing fee, which could range as high as 8,900 dollars,27 was an 
absolute prerequisite to a candidate's participation in the primary 
election. Two prospective candidates who were financially incapable 
of paying the requisite fees alleged that the Texas system denied 
them their right to candidacy.28 Their action was joined by several 
voters who expressed the desire to cast their ballots for the excluded 
candidates.29 
While recognizing that the "initial and direct impact of filing fees 
is felt by aspirants for office,"30 the Court focused its attention on the 
voters' contentions since the Texas system, by creating barriers to 
candidate access to the primary ballot, tended to limit the field of 
candidates from whom voters might choose.31 Once the Court found 
an infringement of fundamental voting rights, the State's failure to 
establish a compelling state interest32 dictated the Court's holding 
that the filing fee system violated the equal protection clause.33 
A broad reading of Bullock might suggest that any statutory bar-
rier to candidacy, since it necessarily has some effect on the choice of 
voters, can be justified only by a showing of a compelling state in-
24. See cases cited in note 20 supra. 
25. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). 
26. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
27. 405 U.S. at 138 n.11. Fees for district, county, and precinct offices were assessed 
by the county executive committee for the party conducting the primary. The com-
mittee apportioned the cost of the primary in its county among the various candidates, 
in part on the basis of the importance of the offices for which the candidates were 
running. 405 U.S. at 137-38. 
28. 405 U.S. at 135-36. A third prospective candidate failed to have his application 
notarized and to have it accompanied by a statutory loyalty affidavit, and the Court 
did not consider his case since his participation was not necessary. 405 U.S. at 136 n.2. 
29. 405 U.S. at 136. 
30. 405 U.S. at 142. 
31. 405 U.S. at 143. 
32. The State advanced three justifications for its filing fee system. The fees were 
thought necessary to regulate the number of candidates on the ballot. In addition, 
filing fees were allegedly required to protect the "integrity of [the] political process" 
from frivolous or fraudulent candidates. Finally, the State argued that the fees were 
essential to provide a means for financing primary elections. The Court recognized 
these as legitimate state interests, but concluded that there was no showing of 
necessity. 405 U.S. at 144-49. See also Note, The Constitutionality qf Candidate Filing 
Fees, 70 MrcH. L REv. 558, 578-82 (1972). 
33. 405 U.S. at 149. 
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terest. However, the Bullock Court explicitly limited the scope of its 
decision by stating that "not every limitation or incidental burden 
on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of 
review," and suggesting that a barrier to candidacy "does not of itself 
compel close scrutiny."34 The Court stressed a further factor that led 
it to apply strict scrutiny to Texas' filing fee system: "Not only are 
voters substantially limited in their choice of candidates, but there is 
also the obvious likelihood of this limitation falling more heavily on 
the less affluent segment of the community, whose favorites may be 
unable to pay the large costs required by the Texas system."85 Under 
this view, Texas' scheme divided voters into two classes, rich and 
poor, and generally gave more power to the rich.36 The Court rec-
ognized that "[t]his disparity in voting power based on wealth can-
not be described by reference to discrete and precisely defined seg-
ments of the community as is typical of inequities challenged under 
the Equal Protection Clause . . . ." but concluded, "[W]e would 
ignore reality were we not to recognize that this system falls with un-
equal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their 
economic status."37 Therefore, the critical aspect of Bullock was that 
the filing fee system might have denied an effective vote to a recogniz-
able group, the poor, by excluding from the ballot candidates who 
were too poor to pay the fee.38 
In Williams v. Rhodes the plaintiffs challenged Ohio's law regulat-
ing the formation of political parties and their acquisition of places 
on the ballot. The law required a new political party seeking a 
ballot position in the presidential elections to obtain petitions signed 
by the number of voters equal to fifteen per cent of the aggregate 
votes cast in the preceding gubernatorial election and to file the 
petitions early in the election year.39 In contrast, any party that had 
received ten per cent of the votes cast in the prior election automati-
cally retained its ballot position without filing any petitions.40 The 
34. 405 U.S. at 143. 
35. 405 U.S. at 144. 
36. As the Court put it, the scheme "gives to the affluent the power to place on the 
ballot their own names or the names of the persons they favor." 405 U.S. at 144. 
37. 405 U.S. at 144. 
38. However, the Court also said, "This would be a different case if the fees 
approximated the cost of processing a candidate's application for a place on the 
ballot, a cost resulting from the candidate's decision to enter a primary." 405 U.S. at 
148 n.29. But the amount of fee should be irrelevant if it prevents an otherwise 
qualified candidate from running for office. See Note, supra note 32, at 583. 
39. 393 U.S. at 24-25. In addition, several other very stringent conditions had to be 
met. The new party had to elect committeemen for a state central committee and 
delegates to a national convention, all persons who had not voted in another party's 
primary in the past four years. Also there was a possible condition that the petitions 
from 15 per cent of the electorate be signed only by persons who had never voted before. 
393 U.S. at 25 n.l. 
40. 393 U.S. at 25-26. 
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American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party, as new 
parties41 that could not comply with the more stringent requirements 
imposed on them, joined voters who supported the parties' candidates 
in contending that these requirements denied them the equal pro-
tection of the laws. The Supreme Court stated that the right to vote 
is heavily burdened if voters can choose only between the two estab-
lished parties when others are "clamoring for a place on the ballot."42 
After it had strictly scrutinized the challenged statute, the Court 
directed that the American Independent Party be placed on the 
ballot.43 
As in Bullock, the reach of Williams can be limited by the fact 
that there was an identifiable group of voters who were harmed by 
the state's restrictions on ballot access, namely those who supported 
the new minority parties' views. The Court's invocation of the stric-
ter standard may have rested, then, on the fact that the Ohio election 
law "treated more harshly a group characterized by its dissident sub-
stantive views. "44 
A further limitation on the scope of Williams should be noted. 
The Ohio election law imposed a burden not only on the right to 
vote, but on the right of association as well.415 As the Court observed, 
"The right to form a party for the advancement of political goals 
means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus 
denied an equal opportunity to win votes."46 The Court may have 
subjected the Ohio law to strict scrutiny because it infringed on both 
the right to vote and the right to associate.47 In contrast, no organized 
41. The Socialist Labor Party was an old party that had lost its position on the 
ballot as a result of the requirements and had been unable to regain it. 393 U.S. at 
27-28. 
42. 393 U.S. at 31. 
43. Actually, a preliminary 01·der by Justice Stewart, as circuit justice, had placed 
the American Independent Party on the ballot. The Court's decision allowed it to 
remain on the ballot. The Socialist Labor Party was denied a similar remedy because 
of its delay in asking for relief. The Court felt that such relief could not be granted 
at the time of its decision without serious disruption of the election process. 393 U.S. 
at 34-35. 
44. The Supreme Coui·t, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 86, 94-95 (1968). 
45. 393 U.S. at 30. After framing the question in mixed terms, the Court con-
cluded its discussion by stating: "But here the totality of the Ohio restrictive laws 
taken as a whole imposes a burden on voting and associational rights which we hold 
is an invidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 393 U.S. 
at 34. See also Recent Decision, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 892 (1969); Note, supra note 
32, at 574-76; Recent Decision, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 202 (1969). 
46. 393 U.S. at 31. 
47. Another interpretation is that the Court was supplying alternative constitutional 
grounds, either of which would have been sufficient to support its holding. The Court 
may have been saying that, in the absence of a compelling state interest, the Ohio law 
violated the first amendment as applied to the states through the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment by abridging the right of the new parties' members to 
associate, see 393 U.S. at 41-48 (Harlan, J., concurring), and that it violated the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by creating a classification that in-
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political parties were involved in Manson,48 and the Manson plain-
tiffs apparently alleged no more than that Detroit's age restrictions 
on candidacy infringed their individual voting rights. 
Therefore, Manson's application of the "compelling interest" test 
to the age restrictions on candidacy probably rests primarily upon the 
authority of Bullock. It is clear that age barriers for elective offices 
ultimately limit voters in their choice of candidates. Manson's exclu-
sion from the primary ballot effectively prevented his supporters 
from voting for their preferred candidate.49 But under the narrower 
reading of Bullock and the authority of Jenness v. Fortson50 such a 
burden on voting alone is not necessarily sufficient to trigger applica-
tion of the compelling interest test. Additionally, there must be some 
other factor, perhaps an identifiable group denied its right to a rep-
resentative candidate by the restriction on candidacy. In Bullock, 
there was the "obvious likelihood" that the filing fee requirement 
would fall most heavily on the community's less affluent. 
Similarly, in Manson, as in any controversy involving candidate 
age restrictions, there was perhaps an "obvious likelihood" that the 
restriction's primary impact would be felt by those voters whose age 
was below the statutory minimum for candidacy. Although some can~ 
didates who met the age requirements might have represented the 
underage group's political views, the age restriction was an absolute 
bar to the candidacy of any of the group's own members.51 However, 
while the facts of Manson might thus fall within the ambit of Bul-
fringed the fundamental right to vote. Under this interpretation, the Court's indepen-
dent equal protection holding would be stronger precedent for Manson than under 
the interpretation advanced in the text. 
48. Indeed, Detroit's Common Council elections are nonpartisan. 
49. Although it could be argued that the right to vote is not infringed since a 
write-in ballot is possible, the issue is the right to cast an effective vote. Even if 
Manson had won the election with write-in votes, he would have been prevented from 
assuming office because of his age. As the Manson court stated: "It is hardly an effec-
tive exercise of the franchise to cast a ballot for a person the government will forbid 
from taking office." 345 F. Supp. at 722, 
50. 403 U.S. 431 (1971). In Jenness the Court upheld a Georgia law requiring an 
independent candidate or political parties that received less than 20 per cent of the 
vote in the most recent election to file a petition signed by 5 per cent of the electorate 
in order to gain a place on the ballot. Williams was distinguished because the Georgia 
requirements in their totality did not create a virtual monopoly for the two estab-
lished parties, Georgia freely allowed write-ins, recognized independent candidates, did 
not have an unreasonably early deadline for filing, and allowed voters to sign petitions 
for any number of parties and candidates. In practice, two independent candidates 
had won recent elections. The requirements furthered the State's interest in requiring 
some showing of significant support without unnecessarily freezing the status quo. 403 
U.S. at 434-42. 
51. One historian, speaking of our representative government, wrote, "By virtue of 
the franchise the people were empowered to choose representatives whose virtues and 
abilities were known to them and whose interest was organically related to their own." 
Buel, Democracy and the American Revolution: A Frame of Reference, in THE AD-
VANCE OF DEMOCRACY 48, 62 0, Pole ed. 1967). 
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lock, the Manson opinion is conspicuously devoid of any concern for 
the impact of the candidacy age requirement on any particular group 
of voters. One of the plaintiffs who desired to vote for Manson was 
thirty-five years old52 and thus clearly outside the class of underage 
voters. But the court found the classification burdensome to "Manson 
and his supporters" without distinguishing between the younger and 
older supporters.53 From this it may be inferred that the court con-
sidered it unnecessary to identify a discrete group on which the can-
didacy restriction weighed most heavily and that it applied the 
compelling interest test to the restriction solely because it infringed 
indirectly the rights of individual voters. This reading of Manson 
would represent an extension of Bullock, for it could lead to the use 
of the compelling interest test whenever voters challenge the con-
stitutionality of any statutory or constitutional restriction that denies 
a place on the ballot to their preferred candidate. Such provisions in-
clude those limiting an elected official to a maximum number of 
terms,54 prohibiting convicts from running for office,55 placing maxi-
mum ages on the holders of elective offices,56 and denying candidacy 
to individuals already employed in a public capacity.57 Indeed, even 
such traditional requirements as residency58 and citizenship59 might 
be subjected to close scrutiny to determine if they violate the equal 
protection clause. 
The court in :Manson had no occasion to consider possible justi-
fications for Detroit's age limitation on candidacy because the defen-
dants conceded their inability to supply the compelling interest 
that the court demanded.60 At the outset of an inquiry into possible 
justifications it should be noted that the authority to prescribe quali-
fications for candidates to state public offices is among the powers 
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment.61 While the Supreme 
Court in Bullock recognized "the breadth of power enjoyed by the 
States in determining ... the manner of elections," it stated that 
"this power must be exercised in a manner consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."62 Something 
52. 345 F. Supp. at 720. 
53. 345 F. Supp. at 723. 
54-. E.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 282. 
55. E.g., MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 7. 
56. E.g., N.Y. CoNST. art. 6, § 25(b). 
57. E.g., MICH. CoNST. art. 4, § 8. 
58. E.g., ALA. CoNST. art. 5, § 117. 
59. E.g., MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.161 (1967). 
60. 345 F. Supp. at 721. 
61. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." See also Gaunt v. Brown, 341 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D. Ohio), affd. mem,, 
409 U.S. 809 (1972). 
62. 405 U.S. at 141. 
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beyond the reserved power of the states must be offered in an attempt 
to justify age limitations on candidacy under the compelling interest 
test. 
The basic objective in prescribing an age restriction for public 
office is probably to ensure that candidates are qualified, and several 
reasons can be advanced for finding a relationship between the age 
and the quality of a candidate. 63 One explanation is that an older 
person is more "experienced" and more likely to be knowledgeable 
about the problems of his constituency.64 However, because one has 
had greater "experience" does not mean in all cases that he has 
learned from his experience or that he can apply it to governmental 
problems. In addition, some younger persons, who are still engaged 
in or have just completed the educational process, may be more 
acutely aware of the events surrounding them than are many older 
citizens.65 Since age is therefore not a precise indicator of a person's 
qualifications for public office, some existing age restrictions may not 
satisfy the strict equal protection test. Under that test, a classification 
designed to deny candidacy to unqualified persons must be drawn 
narrowly enough so that only such persons are excluded from the 
ballot.66 While age restrictions may possibly exclude the incompe-
tent, they simultaneously may exclude many well-qualified citizens 
from the political arena. 67 In addition, they do not ensure that only 
the qualified will run, for numerous other factors-such as education, 
mental capacity, and physical stamina-indicate the ability of a 
candidate. If the state desires to protect its voters from unqualified 
candidates, age should not be the only criterion for classification. It 
63. Some unappealing arguments are that youthful opinions are "too crude and 
erroneous" and that youth lack a responsible attitude: 
[E)very man carried with him in his own experience a scale for measuring the 
deficiency of young politicians; since he would if interrogated be obliged to 
declare that his political opinions at the age of 21 were too crude and erroneous 
to merit an influence on public measures. 
l THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION oF 1787, at 375 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) 
(remarks of Colonel Mason, after moving to require a 25-year•age requirement as a 
qualification for representatives). 
While it is argued that responsibility comes with age, several states, including Michi-
gan, have voiced a vote of confidence in the responsibility of their younger citizens by 
lowering the age of majority to 18 years. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 722.51-.55 (Supp. 
1972). 
64. E.g., THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1835-36, at 305 (H. Dorr 
ed. 1940) (remarks of Mr. Moody on the question of adopting a requirement that the 
governor be 25 years old): "[The Committee on the Executive] thought it reasonable 
to suppose, that whatever might be the talents of a young man, yet his experience, if 
he pursued a proper course, would make him more competent, at the age of 25, to 
fill the office of Governor." 
65. J. DOLAN, REPORT TO THE PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION ON REGISTRATION AND VOTING 
PARTICIPATION ON LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18, at 8-9 (1964). 
66. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
67. Texas in Bullock argued that filing fees served the legitimate purpose of limiting 
the ballot to serious candidates. The Court in rejecting this argument noted that 
filing fees also excluded legitimate candidates unable to pay the fees. 405 U.S. at 
145-46. 
March 1973) Recent Developments 863 
would probably be just as sensible, if not more so, to restrict can-
didacy to those of a certain intelligence rating, or those with a high 
school education, or even those who have had a college economics 
course. 
Another possible justification for minimum-age requirements is 
that they enjoy wide application and general acceptance. The United 
States Constitution establishes age qualifications for senators, repre-
sentatives, and for the President and Vice President.68 Similar pro-
visions requiring minimum ages for state governors, lieutenant 
governors, senators, and representatives exist in most state consti-
tutions. 69 City charters typically specify ages at which the mayor and 
councilmen may run for office.70 History and the status quo thus 
provide persuasive support for age and other candidate restrictions,71 
but it would be difficult to conclude that such factors rise to the 
dignity of compelling governmental interests.72 
Given the decision to apply the strict equal protection test, the 
Manson court's invalidation of the twenty-five-year-old minimum-age 
requirement seems correct. However, common sense dictates that 
the state must show a compelling interest in a candidacy age restric-
tion at some point; no one would suggest that a five-year-old child 
is capable of handling the duties of a city councilman or state legis-
lator. In an analogous context, the Ninth Circuit stated in United 
States v. Duncan: 73 
At some point on the age scale, all would agree that those below it 
should not be jurors because of immaturity and lack of education. 
Opinions may differ as to where the line should be drawn, but not as 
to whether it should be drawn at all.74 
68. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2-3 (a senator must be 30 and a representative must be 
25 years old); art. II, § 2 (the President must be 35); amend. XII (the Vice President 
must be 35). 
69. For example, under the Michigan constitution the Governor and Lieutenant 
Governor must be 30, art. 5, § 7, and the state senators and representatives must be 
21, art. 4, § 6. 
70. E.g., DETROIT, MICH,, CHARTER tit. IV., ch. III, § 2; tit. III, ch. I, § 4 (1963). 
71. The Missouri supreme court in State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 483 S.W .2d 70, 
76 (1972), upheld a residency requirement with this justification: "Durational residency, 
citizenship, and age requirements as conditions to holding office, both federal and state, 
have been provided throughout the history of the country." But, in a strong dissent 
to the majority opinion, Judge Seiler argued that a historical justification is not 
persuasive or relevant. He said, "Historically, it used to be that 21 was the age 
for voting. Now it is 18. Historically, only men had the right to vote. Now, both men 
and women can vote .••• Times are changing." 483 S.W.2d at 77. 
72. In fact, the Manson court expressly rejected an attempt to analogize the present 
restriction to the age restrictions in the Federal Constitution. 345 F. Supp. at 724 n.2. 
Furthermore, by the criterion of "one person, one vote" the United States Senate is 
malapportioned. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court imposed that standard on both 
houses of state legislatures. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553 (1964). 
73. 456 F.2d 1401 (1972). 
74. 456 F.2d at 1405. 
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The question of the point at which age should become a criterion for 
granting responsibility has been argued in many areas,715 most notably 
in debates concerning the minimum voting age. The Supreme Court 
upheld the congressionally approved minimum age for federal elec-
tions at eighteen years,76 and this standard was subsequently adopted 
as the national voting age in the twenty-sixth amendment. Given 
the intimate relation between the validity of candidacy restrictions 
and the rights of voters, this standard is a logical and convenient 
stopping point.77 Thus, Manson should not be read to suggest that 
an eighteen-year-old minimum-age requirement is constitutionally 
invalid.78 Even a narrow reading of Manson, however, could have a 
profound effect on age requirements for elective offices. For example, 
Manson's interpretation of the compelling interest test could be ap-
plied to invalidate age requirements for the offices of mayor, county 
commissioner, state legislator, and even governor. 
The Manson opinion thus foreshadows the wholesale invalidation 
of existing age restrictions on candidacy. Its conclusions represent 
an extension of existing law. Yet, when viewed within the context of 
our democratic, representative form _of government, the decision may 
not appear so aberrational. The court's elimination of statutory 
prohibitions against an eighteen-year old seeking a seat on the Detroit 
Common Council means not that age is irrelevant to qualifications 
but only that the weighing of a candidate's age as a factor in as-
sessing his qualifications is reserved ultimately and exclusively to 
the_ voters, along with all of the other factors that they inevitably 
consider in casting their ballots. It may be assumed that a young 
candidate's knowledge and experience will be questioned by op-
ponents, and he will have the burden to prove to the electorate that 
his youth ·will not adversely affect his capacity to represent them 
adequately.79 
The fundamental question raised by a case like Manson may be 
75. For example, the minimum drinking age, the minimum driving age, and the age 
of majority have probably been considered in all state legislatures. 
76. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
77. Cf. Oregon v: Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 294 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting): 
Yet to test the power to establish an age qualification by the "compelling interest" 
standard is really to deny a State any choice at all, because no State could demon-
strate a "compelling interest" in drawing the line with respect to age at one point 
rather than another. 
78. The issue in Manson was apparently limited to whether one who is 18 years 
old can be denied a place on the ballot solely because he is under 25. See 345 F. Supp. 
at 721. 
79. As the court in Mogk v. City of Detroit, !l!l5 F. Supp. 698, 701 (E.D. Mich. 
1971), stated: 
It is a matter· of common knowledge that those who seek public office go to 
considerable effort and expense to secure exposure, and it may be safely assumed 
that o.eponents in an election race will seek out and make known the shortcomings 
of their opposition and assert their own superior qualifications for a particular 
post. 
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not whether age restrictions are sufficiently related to the state goal 
of ensuring that only qualified candidates run for office, but rather 
whether the government's imposition on the electorate of its defini-
tion of "qualified" is proper in a democracy. The state's assertion 
that its criteria for candidacy advance some compelling state interest 
may represent nothing more than a paternalistic distrust of voter 
judgment.80 Perhaps, then, Manson's underlying message is that 
the electoral process can and indeed should be the best safeguard 
against unqualified individuals assuming elective office. The voting 
citizenry, not the state, should be the ultimate judge of the com-
petency or incompetency of those who desire to represent them in 
public office. 
80. Of course, this argument taken to an extreme would render illegitimate any 
attempt by a state to draw an age-based restriction. Under this logic the voters are 
capable of judging for themselves whether, for example, a five-year old is qualified. 
However, it is unlikely that a court would declare that the state's interest in protecting 
its electoral system is not compelling. Common sense would seem to indicate that a 
state could draw lines to prevent such obviously frivolous candidacies. As suggested 
above, 18, the voting age, is a likely stopping point. With this line, all the electorate 
can vote for candidates of their age group. 
